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RECENT DECISIONS

935

STATUTES--LEGISLATION IN VAGUE TERMs--A Minnesota statute, dealing with the regulation of common carriers and requiring permits for operating
as such, contained the following language: "The terms 'common carrier' and
'contract carrier' shall not apply to any person engaged in the business of operating motor vehicles in the transportation of property exclusively within the zone
circumscribed by a line running parallel to the corporate limits of any city or
village or contiguous cities and/or villages and 35 miles distant therefrom when
such person resides within the zone." 1 The plaintiff claimed that under that
provision he was not required to secure a permit for his limited operations. The
Railroad and Warehouse Commission and the Attorney General insisted that
the permit requirement applied to plaintiff and had imposed fines and other penalties upon him. He started action for declaratory judgment to determine the
rights and duties of the parties. Defendants, the Attorney General and mem-
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Quoted from principal case at 777.
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bers of the commission, in their answer joined in seeking a construction of the
statute "asserting that the provision here considered is vague, uncertain, and
indefinite in its language, making interpretation difficult, if not imp9ssible." 2
Held, the quoted part of the statute is "unconstitutional for indefiniteness," 8
hence void. Anderson v. Burnquist:, (Minn. 1943) I I N.W. (2d) 776.
That the statutory language was hopelessly vague and indefinite seems pretty
clear. But one may wonder why its voidness is placed on the ground of unconstitutionality. The court in this respect applied the doctrine of State v. Eich.4
See also Connally v. General Const. Co. 5 The subject is fully discussed in an
article published sometime ago in this Review.6 It is there pointed out that except
when it is sought to get the question involving a state statute into the federal
courts no constitutional provisions need be considered. In the article it is said:
"The problem under discussion comes fundamentally to this: within its
appropriate sphere the legislative body may prescribe rules of human conduct. This involves necessarily the statement of a rule and its promulgation.
Not all collocations of words, even after subjection to the process of construction, can be said to lay down a rule, which, after all, is the very essence
of a law. The test of the sufficiency of the language in this respect is necessarily lacking in precision. On the one side, the meaning need not be ob.vious to the most ignorant, and on the other, that the most learned are able
to determine the sense of the language should not be sufficient. The test,
it is believed, should involve -the standard of the mythical person of ordinary
intelligence, but not standing necessarily in complete isolation and confined
tq the bare words of the statute. •And written law not in a tongue in common use, it is submitted, would be of no effect because lacking the essential
promulgation, even in the absence of contitutional requirement." 1

R.W.A.

Ibid.
Id. at 779.
4 204 Minn. 134, 282 N.W. 810 (1938).
5 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126 (1925).
6 Aigler, "Legislation in Vague or General Terms,," 21 M1cH. L. REV. 831
(1923).
7 Id. at 850-851:
2

3

